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The federal funds rate has been stuck at the zero bound for over two years and the Fed has turned to
unconventional monetary policies, such as large scale asset purchases to provide stimulus to the economy.
This paper uses a structural VAR with daily data to identify the effects of monetary policy shocks
on various longer-term interest rates during this period. The VAR is identified using the assumption
that monetary policy shocks are heteroskedastic: monetary policy shocks have especially high variance
on days of FOMC meetings and certain speeches, while there is nothing unusual about these days from
the perspective of any other shocks to the economy. A complementary high-frequency event-study
approach is also used. I find that stimulative monetary policy shocks lower Treasury and corporate








During the recent ﬁnancial crisis, the Federal Reserve sharply lowered the target for
the federal funds rate. In December 2008, the federal funds rate was set to the zero
lower bound (more precisely in a target range from zero to 25 basis points), and
has remained there since then. With monetary policy stuck at the zero bound, the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) began using other, less conventional, ways
to further stimulate aggregate demand. This included statements signaling that the
funds rate would be kept at the zero bound for a long time, programs geared towards
supporting certain critical credit markets that were frozen, such as the Commercial
Paper Funding Facility and the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility. And it
included providing additional stimulus to the economy by large-scale asset purchases
(LSAPs) of Treasury securities and other high-grade bonds, a policy that is commonly
referred to as quantitative easing. A key motivation for these purchases was to try
to lower the interest rates being paid by households and businesses, so as to support
consumption and investment spending. The rationale put forth by Federal Reserve
oﬃcials mainly relies on a preferred habitat paradigm, as envisioned by Modigliani
and Sutch (1966, 1967) and more recently by Vayanos and Vila (2009) in which
markets are segmented, investors demand bonds of a speciﬁc type, and the interest
rate is determined by the supply and demand of bonds of that particular type (Kohn
(2009)). The LSAPs could also work in other ways, such as by aﬀecting agents’
expectations of the future course of monetary policy.
More than two years after the overnight rate hit the zero bound, there is a rapidly-
growing literature on assessing the eﬀects of the unconventional monetary policies
that have been used over this period. Important contributions include Doh (2010),
D’Amico and King (2010), Gagnon et al. (2010), Hamilton and Wu (2010), Neely
1(2010), Hancock and Passmore (2011) and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgenson
(2011). Also, Swanson (2011) reexamined Operation Twist from the 1960s using an
event-study perspective, and compared it to the unconventional monetary policies
presently being employed by the Federal Reserve.
Measuring the eﬀects of monetary policy shocks in this environment however poses
special challenges. In normal times, the federal funds rate measures the stance of
monetary policy. But things are murkier at the zero bound. There isn’t as clean a
single measure of the overall stance of unconventional monetary policy. And while one
could proxy the stance of monetary policy by the size of the Fed’s balance sheet, with
forward-looking ﬁnancial markets, one would expect a policy of asset purchases to
impact asset prices not at the time that the purchases are actually made, but rather
at the time that investors learn that they will take place. LSAPs are announced ahead
of time, in the statements that follow FOMC meetings. These statements are in turn
anticipated to some extent by investors, whose expectations have been guided by
speeches and other comments by FOMC members. Furthermore, whereas the federal
funds futures market gives a fairly clear measure of investors’ real-time expectations
for changes in the target federal funds rate, there is no such measure of expectations
o ft h es i z eo fL S A P s .
In this paper, I propose measuring the eﬀects of monetary policy shocks during
this period of unconventional monetary policy using a structural vector autoregression
(VAR) in ﬁnancial variables at the daily frequency, employing the methodology of
Rigobon (2003) and Rigobon and Sack (2003, 2004, 2005). The idea is to identify
days on which the variance of monetary policy shocks was especially high, during the
period when the federal funds rate was stuck at the zero bound and unconventional
approaches monetary policy were being deployed. These are days of FOMC meetings
and days with other announcements that apparently altered investors’ views about the
2likely extent of monetary policy actions. Comparing the variance-covariance matrix
of VAR innovations on these and other days enables identiﬁcation of the eﬀects of
these monetary policy shocks. In principle, this goes back to the idea of measuring
monetary policy shocks in a VAR of Sims (1980), Bernanke (1986) and Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (1996), but it does so without tying monetary policy decisions
to the level of the target federal funds rates. But unlike the earlier VAR literature,
identiﬁcation does not depend on the standard short-run zero restrictions. Instead,
this is an identiﬁcation strategy using heteroskedasticity in daily-frequency data.
It should be emphasized that this approach addresses a somewhat diﬀerent ques-
tion from the analysis of the eﬀects of LSAPs by Gagnon et al. (2010), Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-Jorgenson (2011) and other authors. My approach here identiﬁes policy
shocks from the total eﬀect of FOMC-related news on a set of asset prices during
this period of unconventional monetary policy. FOMC statements could impact asset
prices via LSAPs–LSAPs are surely the dominant tool of monetary policy when the
economy is stuck at the zero bound. But FOMC statements could also work in other
ways, such as by signaling that the federal funds rate will be kept low (over and above
the signaling eﬀect of LSAPs), or even by changing agents’ beliefs about the under-
lying state of the economy (if they think that the Fed has some private information).
The proposed methodology measures the total eﬀects of FOMC news and cannot dis-
entangle the eﬀects of these diﬀerent channels. Of course, the separate identiﬁcation
of the eﬀects of diﬀerent FOMC statements is an important question. Nonetheless,
the structural VAR approach considered here brings some important advantages. It
circumvents the diﬃculties in measuring market expectations for Fed statements–it
isn’t necessary to specify what the markets learned from Fed statements, it is only
necessary to specify the times at which a signiﬁcant news came out, a much easier
task. It allows for the possibility that other shocks occurred on the same days as
3the monetary policy shocks. And it provides an estimate of the persistence of the
monetary policy shocks, which the standard event-study methodology cannot do.
Over the period since November 2008, I estimate that monetary policy shocks
have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on ten-year yields and long-maturity corporate bond yields
that wear oﬀ over the next few months. The eﬀect on two-year Treasury yields is very
small. The initial eﬀect on corporate bond yields is a bit more than half as large as
the eﬀect on ten-year Treasury yields. This ﬁnding is important as it shows that the
news about purchases of Treasury securities had eﬀects that were not limited to the
Treasury yield curve. That is, the monetary policy shocks not only impacted Treasury
rates, but were also transmitted to private yields which have a more direct bearing
on economic activity. There is slight evidence of a rotation in breakeven rates from
Treasury Inﬂation Protected Securities (TIPS), with short-term breakevens rising and
long-term forward breakevens falling.
The plan for the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the
methodology and the identifying assumptions. Section 3 describes the data and re-
ports the results of the empirical work. Section 4 discusses a closely-related “event-
study” approach that relates the VAR errors to monetary policy surprises measured
using high-frequency intradaily data in small windows that bracket the announce-
ment times. This alternative methodology ends up giving consistent results, but with
estimates that are somewhat more precise. Section 5 concludes.
2T h e M e t h o d
I assume that a x1 vector of yields, , has the reduced form VAR representation
() =  +  (1)
4where  denote the reduced form forecast errors. I further assume that these reduced




where  is the th structural shock,  is a x1 vector, and the structural shocks
are independent of each other and over time. The parameters (),  and {}

=1
are all assumed to be constant.
The monetary policy shock is ordered ﬁrst but this is for notational convenience
only. The ordering of variables is irrelevant as a Choleski decomposition will not be
used for identiﬁcation. The monetary policy shock has mean zero and variance 2
1
on announcement days, and variance 2
0 on all other days, while all other structural
shocks are identically distributed with mean zero and variance 1 on all dates. The
identifying assumption is that 2
0 6= 2
1. Put another way, the identifying assumption
is that news about monetary policy comes out in a lumpy manner, and the days on
which it comes out are determined by accident of the calendar; and so the volatility
of other structural shocks should be identical on these and other days. This strategy
of identiﬁcation through heteroskedasticity was ﬁrst proposed by Rigobon (2003) and
applied to asset price data by Rigobon and Sack (2003, 2004, 2005), becoming quite
popular in the identiﬁcation of structural VARs since then.
Let Σ0 and Σ1 denote the variance-covariance matrices of reduced form errors on
non-announcement and announcement days, respectively. Clearly,















This allows 1 to be identiﬁed. Without loss of generality, I adopt the normalization
5that 2
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0) are not separately identiﬁed. I am seeking only
to identify the eﬀects of monetary policy shocks, not the other structural shocks in
the VAR (2), therefore imposing further structure on the system is not needed.
The econometric strategy is to estimate the VAR and construct the sample variance-
covariance matrices of residuals on non-announcement and announcement days, re-
spectively, ˆ Σ0 and ˆ Σ1. Then the parameters in the vector 1 can be estimated by
solving the minimum distance problem
ˆ 1 =a r gm i n
1
[(ˆ Σ1 − ˆ Σ0) − (1
0
1)]
0[ˆ 0 + ˆ 1]




where ˆ 0 and ˆ 1 are estimates of the variance-covariance matrices of (ˆ Σ0) and
(ˆ Σ1), respectively. Estimates of the impulse responses can then be traced out.
This leaves the question of statistical inference. Use of the bootstrap may help
to mitigate concerns about statistical inference in a small sample size. I do bootstrap
inference in three parts. First, I want to test the hypothesis that announcement
and non-announcement days are no diﬀerent: that Σ0 = Σ1. I do this using the test
statistic
[(ˆ Σ1 − ˆ Σ0)]
0[ˆ 0 + ˆ 1]
−1[(ˆ Σ1 − ˆ Σ0)] (5)
and comparing it to a distribution in which announcement and non-announcement
days are randomly scrambled, so that the two variance-covariance matrices are equal
by construction under the null in the bootstrap samples. Rejection of this null hy-
pothesis means that the identiﬁcation condition is satisﬁed.
Second, I want to conduct inference on the structural impulse responses, given that
they are identiﬁed. As the data are persistent, I use the bias-adjusted bootstrap of
Kilian (1998), except that instead of resampling from individual vectors of residuals,
6I use the stationary bootstrap (Politis and Romano (1994)) to resample blocks of
residuals of expected length of 10 days. This means that the bootstrap should preserve
some of the volatility clustering that is evident in the original data.1 This allows
conﬁdence intervals for the impulse responses to be constructed. This bias adjustment
is also applied to the point estimates.
Finally, this same bootstrap can be used to test the hypothesis that Σ1 − Σ0 =
10
1, in other words that there is a single monetary policy shock. This is done by
comparing the test statistic
[(ˆ Σ1 − ˆ Σ0) − ( ˆ 1 ˆ 
0
1)]
0[ˆ 0 + ˆ 1]
−1[(ˆ Σ1 − ˆ Σ0) − ( ˆ 1 ˆ 
0
1)] (6)
to the distribution from the bias-adjusted bootstrap.2
3D a t a a n d R e s u l t s
In the baseline implementation of this method, I use daily data on six diﬀerent interest
rates from the period November 3 2008 to December 28 2010. These are the two- and
ten-year nominal Treasury zero-coupon yields from the data set of Gürkaynak, Sack
and Wright (2007), the ﬁve-year TIPS breakeven3 and the ﬁve-to-ten-year forward
TIPS breakeven, from the data set of Gürkaynak, Sack and Wright (2010) and the
Moody’s indices of BAA and AAA corporate bond yields (not spreads). A VAR (1)
was ﬁtted to these data.
Table 1 shows the list of 21 monetary policy announcement days. The criterion
1Simply resampling from the residuals in the usual way would however give very similar results.
2More precisely, if ˆ Σ∗
0, ˆ Σ∗
1, ˆ ∗
1, ˆ  ∗
0 and ˆ  ∗
1 denote the bootstrap analogs of ˆ Σ0, ˆ Σ1, ˆ 1, ˆ 0
and ˆ 1, respectively, then the bootstrap simulates the distributions of 
0[ˆ  ∗
0 + ˆ  ∗
1 ]−1 where  =
(ˆ Σ∗
1 − ˆ Σ∗
0) − ( ˆ ∗
1 ˆ ∗0
1 ) − ((ˆ Σ1 − ˆ Σ0) − ( ˆ 1 ˆ 0
1)).
3This is the spread between a nominal and TIPS bond, also known as inﬂation compensation. It
is inﬂuenced by expected inﬂation, the inﬂation risk premium, and the TIPS liquidity premium.
7for inclusion in this list is that it be either the day of any FOMC meeting during the
period in which monetary policy was stuck at the zero bound,4 or the day of another
announcement or speech by Chairman Bernanke that was seen as especially germane
to the prospects for LSAPs. One might of course include days of other speeches or
releases of FOMC minutes. I did not do so, because it is important that the esti-
mation of the variance-covariance matrix on announcement days is not contaminated
with days on which there is only trivial or indirect news about unconventional mone-
tary policy; that will only blunt the distinction between the two variance-covariance
matrices that is crucial to identiﬁcation.
T h ed a y sl i s t e di nT a b l e1s p a nb o t ht h eﬁrst period of quantitative easing (QE1),
during which time the Fed bought a range of assets including a large volume of
mortgage backed securities and the second period of quantitative easing (QE2), which
involved Treasury purchases alone. Within the 21 days listed in Table 1, 10 of them
are days that seem especially important–they are days around the start of the ﬁrst
and second phases of quantitative easing. These especially important announcement
days are marked in bold.
The variance-covariance matrix of reduced form errors was then estimated over
the 21 announcement days, and over non-announcement days. The method described
in the previous section was then used to estimate 1, the contemporaneous eﬀects of
a monetary policy shock on yields.
The resulting impulse responses function estimates and 90 percent bootstrap conﬁ-
dence intervals in this baseline VAR are reported in Figure 1. The identiﬁed monetary
policy shock is normalized to lower ten-year yields by 25 basis points instantaneously.
4December 16, 2008 was included. This was the day of the FOMC meeting at which the funds
rate was set at zero, but the statement also included discussion of LSAPs. The unscheduled FOMC
meeting of May 9, 2010 (after which a statement related to foreign exchange swaps was released) is
not included because it has no direct bearing on domestic monetary policy.
8The shock lowers AAA and BAA rates, by a bit more than half as much as the drop
in ten-year Treasury yields. These eﬀects tend to wear oﬀ over time fairly fast–the
impulse responses on ten-year Treasuries are statistically signiﬁcant, but only for a
short time. The eﬀect on corporate yields is statistically signiﬁcant in this VAR, but
only for a very short time. Two-year yields fall, but the eﬀect is modest.5 The half-life
of the estimated impulse responses for Treasury and corporate yields is one or two
months. Short-term breakeven rates rise slightly, while longer-term forward breakeven
rates fall, but these eﬀects are not statistically signiﬁcant. The estimates of the ini-
tial eﬀects are mostly consistent with the evidence from event studies. For example,
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgenson (2011) found that quantitative easing policies
lower long-term Treasuries and the highest rated corporate bonds, and report some
evidence that breakeven rates rise. They however found that quantitative easing has
negligible eﬀects on BAA rates.
The top panel of Table 2 reports the results of comparing the test statistics in
equations (5) and (6) with their bootstrap p-values in this baseline VAR. The null
hypothesis that the reduced form variance-covariance matrix is the same on announce-
ment and non-announcement days is rejected. The null hypothesis that the diﬀerence
between the two variance-covariance matrices can be factored in the form 1
0
1 is not
rejected. That indicates that the data can be well characterized by a single monetary
policy shock.
The structural VAR approach measures the monetary policy shock directly from
its eﬀects on interest rates. As noted in the introduction, this has a number of advan-
tages: expectations do not have to be measured, and dynamic eﬀects can be traced
5Obviously over this period, monetary policy shocks could have no eﬀect on the federal funds
rate or other very short-term interest rates by construction. But the two-year yield was not at the
zero bound (it averaged 81 basis points over the sample), and so monetary policy surprises could
conceivably have had some eﬀe c to nt h i s .H o w e v e r ,i tt u r n so u tt h a tt h ee ﬀect is small.
9out. However, it also has a number of limitations. In particular, it is silent on the
relative contribution of diﬀerent aspects of unconventional monetary policy (forward
looking guidance about the federal funds rate, LSAPs etc.). Nevertheless, looking at
the evidence here in conjunction with other studies that have considered the eﬀects of
asset purchases more directly, and also noting that the main eﬀect of monetary policy
shocks during the crisis is on long-term interest rates, while short-term interest rates
are little changed, it seems reasonable to surmise that LSAPs represent an important
component of these identiﬁed policy shocks.
3.1 Robustness checks and extensions
This subsection reports the results of three types of extensions and robustness checks.
F i r s t ,t h ea n a l y s i si sr e d o n eu s i n gt h em o r es t r i n g e n td e ﬁnition of the announcement
dates (only the announcement days marked in bold in Table 1). This should make the
diﬀerence between policy and non-policy dates starker, potentially helping identiﬁca-
tion. Impulse response estimates are shown in Figure 2. The results are quite similar
to those in Figure 1, except that the impulse responses are a little more precisely
estimated in this case, and the decline in longer-term corporate yields is statistically
signiﬁcant for a month or so.
The second robustness check is for the sample period chosen to estimate the VAR.
The baseline VAR is estimated over a short sample period. A natural alternative is
to consider estimating the reduced form parameters in () over the period since
January 1999 (when the TIPS yields are ﬁrst available), while continuing to estimate
Σ0 and Σ1 on non-announcement and announcement days starting in November 2008.
This gives the potential beneﬁto fg r e a t e re ﬃciency, although at the potential cost of
having to impose the same coeﬃcients of the VAR in the crisis and pre-crisis periods.
10The results of this exercise are shown in Figure 3. They are again qualitatively similar
to those shown in Figure 1. However, the eﬀects on ten-year Treasury yields remain
signiﬁcant for about three months, and the eﬀects on long-term corporate yields are
also signiﬁcant for a while.
I also consider an alternative speciﬁcation for the set of variables included in the
VAR, replacing the corporate bond yields wi t ht h ey i e l do nc u r r e n t - c o u p o nt h i r t y -
year Fannie Mae mortgage backed securities.6 The results of this exercise are shown
in Figure 4. The monetary policy shock that lowers ten-year Treasury yields by 25
basis points is estimated to lower MBS rates by about 15 basis points. The eﬀect is
statistically signiﬁcant for a month or so, but the eﬀect again wears oﬀ fairly quickly.
This paper does not diﬀerentiate between the ﬁrst and second phases of quantitative
easing (QE1 and QE2, respectively). However, QE1 involved heavy purchases of
MBS, whereas QE2 entailed purchases of Treasuries only. It seems reasonable to
surmise that if one were able separately to identify monetary policy shocks in these
two subperiods, then the sensitivity of MBS rates would be bigger in QE1 than in
QE2.7
Finally, I also consider an alternative speciﬁcation for the set of variables included
in the VAR, replacing the corporate bond yields with the sum of the Markit ﬁve-year
investment grade corporate CDS index and the ﬁve-year swap rate. Under CDS-bond
arbitrage, this should theoretically be close to a ﬁve-year investment grade corporate
bond yield. The monetary policy shock signiﬁcantly lowers this synthetic CDS-based
6Current coupon securities are benchmark mortgage backed securities (MBS). Naturally one
would be most interested in actual mortgage rates, rather than the yields on MBS, from the perspec-
tive of assessing the ability of monetary policy to support the housing market. However, mortgage
rates are not available at the daily frequency, and so MBS rates are the best available substitute for
use in this paper.
7In other (not reported) robustness checks, I considered trivariate VARs with two- and ten-year
nominal Treasury yields plus one other interest rate (a breakeven rate, a corporate bond yield, or the
MBS yield). These VARs again gave similar results, though in some cases the conﬁdence intervals
were a bit tighter.
11corporate bond yield, but the eﬀect wears oﬀ in the subsequent months.
Table 2 includes the speciﬁcation tests of the hypotheses that Σ0 = Σ1 and that
Σ1−Σ0 c a nb ef a c t o r e di n t ot h ef o r m1
0
1 for the alternative deﬁnition of announce-
ment dates, the alternative sample period for estimating (), and the alternative
choices of variables in the VAR. In all these cases, the hypothesis that announcement
and non-announcement days are equivalent is rejected, while the hypothesis of a single
monetary policy shock is accepted.
3.2 Avoiding estimating the VAR
An alternative approach is to avoid estimating a VAR altogether, and instead simply
assume that the expectation of each interest rate on day  is well approximated
by it’s value on day  − 1. This means that the one-step-ahead forecast errors, ,
c a ns i m p l yb ea p p r o x i m a t e db y∆.T h ed i ﬀerence between the variance-covariance
matrix of ∆ on announcement and non-announcement days can again be factored
as in equation (3), giving estimates of the instantaneous impulse responses of the
monetary policy shock. However, in avoiding estimating a VAR, this approach gives up
on trying to estimate the impulse responses at longer horizons. Indeed this approach
of treating the daily ﬁrst diﬀerences as approximate reduced form errors was employed
by Rigobon and Sack (2005).
The results are shown in Table 3. The size of the monetary policy shock is normal-
ized to be one that lowers ten-year Treasury yields by 25 basis points. It generates
causes a small and not quite statistically signiﬁcant drop in two-year yields, and
signiﬁcantly lowers corporate bond yields. The instantaneous impulse responses are
qualitatively similar to those from estimating the VAR, although the point estimate
of the impact on corporate yields is a bit larger.
124 Event-study methodology and intradaily data
Identiﬁcation through heteroskedasticity collapses to the event-study methodology in
the limiting case that the announcement windows contain only the shocks that we
wish to identify—that is, when the variances of all other shocks are negligible. That’s a
stronger assumption, and is surely not reasonable using daily data, especially over this
turbulent period, but it might be an adequate approximation when high-frequency
intradaily data are used. To consider an event-study methodology, I took quotes on
the front contracts on two-, ﬁve-, ten- and thirty-year bond futures trading on the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) from Tickdata. Table 1 shows the times of each
of the announcements. The monetary policy shock is computed as the ﬁrst principal
component of yield changes8 from 15 minutes before each of these announcements
to 1 hour and 45 minutes afterwards, re-scaled to have a standard deviation of one,
and signed so that a positive surprise represents falling yields.9 No macroeconomic
news announcements occurred in any of these windows and so it seems reasonable to
assume that the monetary policy shock was the overwhelming driver of asset prices
in these time periods. Unlike in the event studies of Gagnon et al. (2010) and
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgenson (2011), the monetary policy surprises are being
measured directly from intraday changes in asset prices.
The approach here is similar in spirit to that of Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson
(2005). These authors recognized that FOMC statements contained both news about
the current setting of the federal funds rate and about its likely future trajectory.
8Yield changes were constructed as returns on the futures contract divided by the duration of
the cheapest-to-deliver security in the deliverable basket.
9This is a fairly wide window, but results are similar using a tighter window from 15 minutes before
the announcement to 15 minutes afterwards. However, the announcements considered represent the
interpretation of statements and speeches, as opposed to giving information about the numerical
value of the target funds rate. Consequently, it seems natural to allow a relatively wide window for
t h em a r k e tt od i g e s tt h en e w s .
13Following many other papers (going back to Kuttner (2001)), they proposed using
current and next-month federal funds futures quotes to measure the surprise compo-
nent of the setting of the target federal funds rate–their key innovation was that they
proposed using the orthogonal change in four-quarter-ahead eurodollar futures rates
as an asset-price-based quantiﬁcation of the separate information in the statement
about the outlook for monetary policy going forward. They called these the target
and path surprises. However, since December 2008, there have been no surprises in the
target federal funds rate, and FOMC statements have done little to monetary policy
expectations over the next few quarters. Under these circumstances, it seems perhaps
more appropriate to use changes in longer-term interest rates as an asset-price-based
quantiﬁcation of monetary policy surprises during this period of unconventional pol-
icy.10 This directly resolves the problem faced by event studies such as Gagnon et
al. (2010) and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgenson (2011) that they did not have
data on market expectations concerning the size of LSAPs.
Table 4 reports the slope coeﬃcients from regressions of various yield changes
and asset price returns onto the monetary policy surprises, measured as described
in the previous paragraph, over the 21 days listed in Table 1. The left-hand-side
variables are not limited to the variables considered in the VAR. Note that in these
regressions, whereas the right-hand-side variable is constructed using high-frequency
intradaily data; the left-hand side variables are daily changes, except for stock index
futures, which are available intradaily.11
A one standard deviation monetary policy surprise is estimated to lower ten-year
Treasury yields by 14 basis points. For comparison, Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson
10Another option would be to use intradaily changes in longer-term eurodollar futures quotes, but
these are quite illiquid at maturities beyond a year or two, and so the use of Treasury futures is
preferable.
11These are returns on the S&P futures contract trading on the CME from Tickdata, from 15
minutes before each announcement to 1 hour and 45 minutes afterwards.
14(2005) estimated that over a period before monetary policy hit the zero bound, it
would take a 100 basis point surprise cut in the target funds rate to lower ten-year
Treasury yields by about this much. In Table 4, corporate bond yields are estimated
to fall by about 9 basis points (a bit more than half as much as the decline in ten-
year Treasury yields), while two-year Treasury yields again fall only a little. There is
a rotation of TIPS breakevens, with ﬁve-year breakevens rising and ﬁve-to-ten-year
forward breakevens falling. A possible interpretation is that the stronger outlook
for demand boosts the short-to-medium-run inﬂation outlook, but the fact that the
LSAPs are overwhelmingly concentrated in nominal (rather than TIPS) securities has
an oﬀsetting eﬀect, pushing longer-term breakevens lower. A one standard deviation
monetary policy surprise is estimated to lower Canadian, UK and German ten-year
government bond yields12 by one-third to one-half as much as the decline in ten-year
US Treasury yields—this indicates that the monetary policy actions have impacted
global expectations for short-term interest rates and/or global risk premia. Rates
on current coupon thirty-year Fannie Mae mortgage backed securities fall about 9
basis points. Corporate spreads constructed as the sum of ﬁve-year swap rates and
investment grade CDS drop about 15 basis points. Stock prices rise; a monetary
policy surprise that lowers ten-year yields by 14 basis points is estimated to boost
stock returns by a bit over half a percentage point13. All of these eﬀects are highly
statistically signiﬁcant, even though the left-hand-side variable is measured at the
daily frequency in most cases, and even though the sample size is just 21 observations.
The SMB factor of Fama and French (returns on small stocks less returns on big
stocks) is not signiﬁcantly aﬀected, consistent with the ﬁnding by some researchers
12These are zero-coupon yields obtained at the daily frequency from the websites of the Bank of
Canada, Bank of England and Bundesbank, respectively.
13For comparison, Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) estimated that, before the zero bound was
reached, an unanticipated 25 basis point surprise reduction of the federal funds rate raised stock
prices by about 1 percent.
15that in recent decades size does not seem to be a priced risk factor in equity markets
any more14. But the monetary policy shock does signiﬁcantly increase the HML factor
(returns on value stocks less returns on growth stocks). Perhaps ﬁrms with high
ratios of book value to market value are most sensitive to the credit channel of the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
I also regressed the estimated reduced form errors from the daily VAR (equation
(1)) onto these monetary policy shocks. The coeﬃcients are interpreted as estimates of
1 in equation (2), and in conjunction with the estimates of the VAR slope coeﬃcients
in (), this allows the eﬀects of the monetary policy shock on the variables in the
VAR to be traced out.15 The resulting impulse responses are shown in Figure 6,
a l o n gw i t h9 0p e r c e n tc o n ﬁdence intervals, using the bootstrap procedure deﬁned
in section 2.16 Figure 7 reports the results from the same exercise, but with the
more stringent deﬁnition of announcement days (as in Figure 2). Figure 8 uses the
same event-study approach, but with () estimated over the period since 1999 (as
in Figure 3). Finally, Figures 9 and 10 uses this event-study approach, but with the
alternative set of variables in the VAR. The results in Figures 6-10 are quite similar to
t h o s ef r o mF i g u r e1 - 5 ,b u tt h ec o n ﬁdence intervals are generally a bit tighter.17 The
monetary policy shock is estimated to lower long-term Treasury and corporate bond
yields, with the eﬀect wearing oﬀ over time but remaining statistically signiﬁcant for
14See, for example, Amihud (2002).
15The idea of identifying a VAR using an auxiliary dataset at higher frequency than the VAR
observations was proposed in other contexts by Faust, Swanson and Wright (2004) and Bernanke
and Kuttner (2005).
16The bootstrap also resamples the intradaily monetary policy surprises–for each bootstrap resid-
ual corresponding to an announcement day, I take the intradaily monetary policy surprise for that
day. The set of bootstrap residuals are regressed on the set of bootstrap monetary policy surprises
to obtain the bootstrap estimate of 1.
17Note that the impulse responses at horizon 0 in Figures 6-10 give the estimates of 1 These
are not quite the same as the estimates reported in Table 4. The parameters in 1 are estimated
by regressing the reduced form errors in the VAR on the monetary policy shocks; Table 4 instead
regresses daily (or intradaily) returns or yield changes on those monetary policy shocks. However,
the estimates of 1 and the estimates reported in Table 4 are fairly close.
16a few months. The half-life of the estimated impulse responses is about two months.
The eﬀect on two-year Treasury yields is again small. Short-term breakevens rise,
and long-term forward breakevens fall, perhaps for the reasons discussed above, with
these eﬀects being on the borderline of statistically signiﬁcance.
Table 5 shows the monetary policy surprises for each announcement day, esti-
mated using high-frequency intradaily data, as proposed in this section. The state-
ment accompanying the March 2009 FOMC meeting (indicating heavy asset pur-
chases) corresponds to more than a 3 standard deviation monetary policy surprise.
The estimates in Figures 6-10 would suggest that this lowered ten-year Treasury yields
by roughly 50 basis points on impact. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgenson (2011)
consider that the statements accompanying the August, September and November
2010 FOMC meetings collectively revealed the essence of the information about QE2.
Much information about QE2 came out at times other than these FOMC meetings18
and so I would be skeptical of simply adding up the responses to these particular three
events to attempt to measure the total eﬀect of this particular monetary program.
If one does so anyway, the three FOMC annoucements sum up to a 1.1 standard
deviation surprise. The estimates in Figures 6-10 indicate that a 1.1 standard devia-
tion monetary policy surprise should lower ten-year Treasury yields by about 15 basis
points on impact.
Of course, judging by the impulse responses in this paper, all these eﬀects wore
oﬀ over the subsequent months.
18For example, the Fed was reported to have sent a survey to primary dealers asking them to
estimate the size of QE2 in late October 2010. The survey form supplied three options: $250 billion,
$500 billion and $1 trillion. The very fact of setting up the survey question in this way was a signal
that dealers surely did not miss.
175C o n c l u s i o n s
In response to the ﬁnancial crisis and the ensuing deep recession, the Federal Reserve
pushed the federal funds rate to the zero lower bound and began engaging in unortho-
dox monetary policies, notably large-scale asset purchases. This paper has proposed
using the tools of identiﬁcation through heteroksedasticity and high-frequency event-
study analysis to measure the eﬀects of monetary policy shocks on the conﬁguration
of interest rates when the conventional tool of monetary policy is stuck at the zero
bound. Monetary policy shocks are estimated to have eﬀects on both long-term Trea-
sury and corporate bond yields that are generally statistically signiﬁcant, with the
eﬀects fading fairly fast over the subsequent months.
The VAR does not measure eﬀects of shocks on low-frequency macroeconomic ag-
gregates. But having estimates of the eﬀects of monetary policy shocks on asset prices
may be helpful for exercises calibrating the impact of these shocks within macroceo-
nomic models. For example, Chung et al. (2011) simulated the eﬀect of QE2 in the
Federal Reserve’s FRB/US model. Their simulation assumed that QE2 lowered Trea-
sury term premia by 25 basis points, but had no direct eﬀect on spreads of corporate
and mortgage rates over their Treasury counterparts. Meanwhile, in FRB/US, the
stronger economic outlook induced by lower term premia endogenously causes corpo-
rate and mortgage rates to fall by more than the drop in Treasury yields. The evidence
in the present paper would suggest that Chung et al. overstates the support to ag-
gregate demand because I ﬁnd that monetary policy surprises had smaller eﬀects on
private sector rates than on Treasury yields. Also, I ﬁnd that the eﬀects of the policy
shocks wear oﬀ faster than Chung et al. assumed. To the extent that longer term
interest rates are important for aggregate demand, unconventional monetary policy
at the zero bound has had a stimulative eﬀect on the economy, but it may have been
quite modest.
18Table 1: Dates of Monetary Policy Announcements at the Zero Bound
Date Event Time
11/25/2008 Fed Announces Purchases of MBS and Agency Bonds 08:15
12/1/2008 Bernanke states Treasuries may be purchased 13:45
12/16/2008 FOMC Meeting 14:15
1/28/2009 FOMC Meeting 14:15
3/18/2009 FOMC Meeting 14:15
4/29/2009 FOMC Meeting 14:15
6/24/2009 FOMC Meeting 14:15
8/12/2009 FOMC Meeting 14:15
9/23/2009 FOMC Meeting 14:15
11/4/2009 FOMC Meeting 14:15
12/16/2009 FOMC Meeting 14:15
1/27/2010 FOMC Meeting 14:15
3/16/2010 FOMC Meeting 14:15
4/28/2010 FOMC Meeting 14:15
6/23/2010 FOMC Meeting 14:15
8/10/2010 FOMC Meeting 14:15
8/27/2010 Bernanke Speech at Jackson Hole 10:00
9/21/2010 FOMC Meeting 14:15
10/15/2010 Bernanke Speech at Boston Fed 08:15
11/3/2010 FOMC Meeting 14:15
12/14/2010 FOMC Meeting 14:15
Notes: This Table lists the days that are treated as “announcement days” for the
identiﬁcation strategy considered in this paper. It consists of all FOMC meetings
during the period when the federal funds rate is stuck at the zero bound, and the
days of certain important speeches and announcements concerning large-scale asset
purchases. Announcement days that are treated as especially important are marked
in bold. Times are in all cases Eastern time.
19Table 2: Speciﬁcation tests
Hypothesis Wald Statistic Bootstrap p-value
Baseline VAR: All Announcement Days
Σ0 = Σ1 47.6 0.034
Σ1 − Σ0 = 10
1 32.3 0.816
Baseline VAR: Ten Most Important Announcement Days
Σ0 = Σ1 97.1 0.003
Σ1 − Σ0 = 10
1 112.4 0.980
Baseline VAR: Longer Estimation Period
Σ0 = Σ1 58.1 0.010
Σ1 − Σ0 = 10
1 35.9 0.780
Alternative VAR with MBS rates
Σ0 = Σ1 53.8 0.011
Σ1 − Σ0 = 10
1 23.2 0.575
Alternative VAR with CDS-based corporate yield
Σ0 = Σ1 72.3 0.001
Σ1 − Σ0 = 10
1 30.3 0.572
Notes: This table reports the results of speciﬁcation tests of the hypotheses that
the variance-covariance matrix of reduced form errors is the same on announcement
and non-announcement days, and that there is a one-dimensional structural shock
that characterizes the diﬀerence between these two sets of days. Bootstrap p-values,
constructed as described in the text, are included in both cases. Results are shown
both for the cases where all days listed in Table 1 are treated as announcement days,
and for cases where only the ten most important days, listed in bold in Table 1, are
treated as announcement days.
20Table 3: Estimates of the instantaneous eﬀects of monetary policy surprises from
one-day changes in interest rates
Estimate Conﬁdence Interval
Ten-year Treasuries -0.25 -0.25 -0.25
Two-year Treasuries -0.04 -0.16 0.01
Five-year Breakevens -0.01 -0.10 0.13
Five-to-ten year forward breakevens -0.15 -0.20 0.14
AAA Yields -0.27 -0.36 -0.07
BAA Yields -0.27 -0.38 -0.07
Notes: This table reports the instantaneous eﬀects of monetary policy surprises tak-
ing one day changes in interest rates as the reduced form forecast errors in the sys-
tem consisting of two- and ten-year Treasury yields, ﬁve and ﬁve-to-ten-year forward
breakevens and AAA and BAA yields. The variance-covariance matrices of these one-
day changes are computed on announcement and non-announcement days, and are
then used to infer the instanantaneous impulse responses.
21Table 4: Coeﬃcients in regressions of yield changes and returns on intradaily
monetary policy surprises
Slope Coeﬃcient Standard Error R-squared
AAA Yields -0.087∗∗∗ 0.013 50.7
BAA Yields -0.087∗∗∗ 0.011 59.0
Two-year Treasuries -0.070∗∗∗ 0.007 81.8
Ten-year Treasuries -0.142∗∗∗ 0.018 77.7
Five-year Breakevens 0.016∗∗ 0.007 12.4
Five-to-ten year forward breakevens -0.033∗∗∗ 0.012 29.6
Ten-year Canadian Yields -0.066∗∗∗ 0.007 66.8
Ten-Year UK Yields -0.048∗∗∗ 0.016 43.2
Ten-Year German Yields -0.045∗∗∗ 0.009 43.1
Fannie Mae MBS Yield -0.087∗∗∗ 0.028 39.9
SMB returns -0.063 0.139 1.3
HML returns 0.467∗∗ 0.237 14.5
S&P returns 0.577∗∗∗ 0.220 30.9
Five-year swap rates+CDS spread -0.149∗∗∗ 0.031 61.2
Notes: This table reports the reports the results of daily yield changes or returns
(intradaily for the case of the S&P futures returns) onto the monetary policy surprise,
measured from high-frequency changes in Treasury futures, as described in the text.
The regression is run over the 21 announcement days listed in Table 1. The standard
errors are heteroskedasticity-robust. One, two and three asterisks denote signiﬁcance
at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively.























Notes: This table shows the monetary policy surprises, estimated as the ﬁrst prin-
cipal component of intradaily changes in yields on Treasury futures contracts on all
announcement days, as described in section 4. The surprises are normalized to have a
unit standard deviation and signed so that a positive number represents falling yields.
23Figure 1: Estimated Impulse Responses in Baseline VAR










































Note: Estimates of the impulse responses from monetary policy shocks onto the 6
variables in the system, from 0 to 250 days. 90 percent bootstrap conﬁdence intervals
are also reported, constructed as described in the text. The monetary policy shock is
normalized to lower ten-year yields by 25 basis points.
24Figure 2: Estimated Impulse Responses Using only 10 Announcement Days










































Note: As for Figure 1, except that only the ten days highlighted in bold in Table 1 are
treated as announcement days.
25Figure 3: Estimated Impulse Responses Using Longer Sample to Estimate VAR










































Note: As for Figure 1, except that the reduced form VAR was estimated over the period
since Janaury 1999, as described in the text.
26Figure 4: Estimated Impulse Responses Using Alternative VAR with MBS Rates



































Note: As for Figure 1, except that the reduced form VAR included Fannie Mae current
coupon MBS yields instead of corporate bond rates.
27Figure 5: Estimated Impulse Responses Using Alternative VAR with CDS-based corporate
yield






























5 Year Invest. Grade CDS+Swap
Note: As for Figure 1, except that the reduced form VAR included the sum of the
Markit ﬁve-year investment grade corporate CDS index and the ﬁve-year swap rate.
Under CDS-bond arbitrage, this should theoretically be close to a corporate bond yield.
28Figure 6: Estimated Impulse Responses in Baseline VAR using Event-Study Identiﬁcation










































Note: Estimates of the impulse responses from monetary policy shocks onto the 6 vari-
ables in the system, from 0 to 250 days. The monetary policy shocks were identiﬁed
as the ﬁrst principal component of changes in bond futures quotes in intraday windows
around the events listed in Table 1. The reduced form VAR errors were then regressed
onto these monetary policy shocks and the impulse responses were computed as de-
scribed in the text. 90 percent bootstrap conﬁdence intervals are also reported.
29Figure 7: Estimated Impulse Responses Using only 10 Announcement Days and Event-Study
Identiﬁcation










































Note: As for Figure 5, except that only the ten days highlighted in bold in Table 1 are
treated as announcement days.
30Figure 8: Estimated Impulse Responses Using Longer Sample to Estimate VAR and Event-
Study Identiﬁcation










































Note: As for Figure 5, except that the reduced form VAR was estimated over the period
since Janaury 1999, as described in the text.
31Figure 9: Estimated Impulse Responses Using Event-Study Identiﬁcation in Alternative VAR
with MBS Rates



































Note: As for Figure 5, except that the reduced form VAR included Fannie Mae current
coupon MBS yields instead of corporate bond rates.
32Figure 10: Estimated Impulse Responses Using Event-Study Identiﬁcation in Alternative
VAR with CDS-based corporate yield


































5 Year Invest. Grade CDS+Swap
Note: As for Figure 5, except that the reduced form VAR included the sum of the
Markit ﬁve-year investment grade corporate CDS index and the ﬁve-year swap rate.
Under CDS-bond arbitrage, this should theoretically be close to a corporate bond yield.
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